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Introduction and Background 
 
‘The right to silence’, according to the Australian High Court, ‘is that right which provides 
the fundamental bases for the common law rules governing the admissibility and reception of 
confessional evidence’ (Aronson and Hunter, 1995, 326). These common law and, in NSW, 
statutory rules surrounding confessional evidence are sometimes said to contain a set of 
related rights and freedoms including: i) voluntariness of confessional evidence; 1 ii) the 
presumption of innocence;2 iii) the burden and standard of proof (‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’);3 iv) the protection against self-incrimination;4 v) a prohibition against any adverse 
inference being drawn against the accused from their silence ‘during official questioning’;5 
and vi) the right to counsel.6 It is the third, fourth and fifth of these ‘silence rights’7 (Dixon 
and Cowdery, 2013) – the burden and standard of proof and the protection or ‘privilege’ 
against self-incrimination both during official questioning and at trial – with which this study 
is mostly concerned, by seeking to show empirically how a selection of these silence rights 
work in practice throughout the criminal process.8  
 
                                                 
1 NSW Law Reform Commission Report 95, 31; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s. 84; R v Swaffield; Pavic v The 
Queen [1998] HCA 1; 192 CLR 159; 151 ALR 98; 72 ALJR 339 (20 January 1998). 
2 NSW Parliamentary Library Briefing Paper 12/2000 Pre-Trial Defence Disclosure: Background to the Criminal 
Procedure Amendment (Pre-Trial Disclosure) Bill 2000, Chapter 3. The Evidence Act, s. 89 (1)(a); LEPRA, s. 
122(1)(a).  
3 Ibid, Evidence Act, ss. 141(1) and 3 (definition of ‘case’); 
4 Ibid, Evidence Act, s. 89(1)(a); Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) (‘LEPRA’), s. 
122(1)(a). 
5 See Petty and Maiden v R (1991) 173 CLR 95, 90, codified by the Evidence Act, s. 89(1)(a); and modified by 
Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217.  
6 LEPRA 2002, s. 22(1); R v Dietrich (1992) 177 CLR 292, [1992] HCA 57. 
7 The definition of ‘the right to silence’ and the use of the term, ‘silence rights’ is contested within the literature 
on evidence law and is the subject of ongoing debate. This debate is explored later in the article, see pp. 13-16. 
8 The author thanks Professor of Public Statistics, James Brown and Public Statistics PhD candidate, Torrington 




The purpose of this project is to contribute to the scholarly literature surrounding the effects 
of the right to silence on conviction within criminal and summary jurisdictions, particularly 
for marginalised or ‘vulnerable’ criminal defendants. This study builds on similar empirical 
work undertaken in respect to the right to silence in the United Kingdom and Singapore 
between the 1970s and early 2000s (see, for instance, Cross, (1971); Jackson, (1991); Bucke, 
Street and Brown (2000); Phillips and Brown, (1998), Yeo (1983); Tan (1997); O’Mahony, 
(1997); Jackson, Quinn and Wolfe (2000); Coldrey, (1991); Leng, (1993)). The latter 
predominantly focused on the effect of introducing ‘adverse inference’ provisions into the 
law of criminal evidence in these jurisdictions (laws allowing judges and juries to draw 
inferences of guilt against an accused person because they exercised their right to silence).9 
No empirical scholarly work has been published in respect to this issue in Australia. 
Accordingly, the findings of this study deepen understandings of how silence is exercised 
throughout the criminal process in a summary Australian jurisdiction that is largely 
unburdened by adverse inference provisions. In this respect this study also provides a useful 
comparator or control study to the existing international scholarship. But its aims are broader. 
This study focuses its enquiry on gaps identified by the largest empirical study on the issue, 
conducted by Bucke and colleagues (et al. 2000), including: i) the extent to which silence 
laws affect marginalised groups (Bucke et al., (2000), p. 76); ii) how silence rights operate in 
respect to charges in which silence is more clearly an issue (such as those involving a fault or 
mens rea element, as opposed to strict liability offences) (Bucke et al., (2000), p. 67); and iii) 
the ways in which decision-making by suspects and defendants operates within the criminal 
process (Bucke et al., (2000), p. xiv). Such information allows stakeholders and policy 
makers greater insight into the significance of silence rights, especially their effects. As 
                                                 
9 In practise, the provisions mean that when law enforcement officials administer a caution to a suspect by 
telling them that they have the right to remain silent and that anything they say may be recorded and used in 
evidence against them, officials must, in addition, advise the suspect that their silence or failure to answer 
questions may be used against them at their trial by a judge or jury to infer guilt: Evidence Act, s. 89A. 
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importantly, it provides researchers and commentators with greater evidence for enhanced 
explanation and understanding of pre-trial criminal procedure, not only between criminal 
jurisdictions (such as between jurisdictions that maintain adverse inference provisions and 
those that do not) but also between criminal and regulatory jurisdictions that frequently 
dispense with the right to silence (Stewart, (2016), p. 100; Comino, (2014)). As a recent 
Australian Law Reform Commission Report on the subject found, ‘evidence regarding the 
effect’ of the right to silence ‘is not easy to come by’ (ALRC, (2016), p. 320).10  
 
The empirical literature on silence rights is polarised by a debate about the effect of adverse 
inference provisions. On one side, academic commentators and civil libertarian lawyers have 
collected data that appears to downplay the significance of the right to silence, perhaps in 
order to save it from erosion by adverse inference provisions (Bucke et al., (2000); Jackson et 
al., (2000); and Leng, (1993)). They have shown that the right to silence is asserted 
infrequently with little effect on conviction. On the other side of the debate are police and 
conservatives who have collated empirical data showing a much higher incidence of silence 
use (Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), (1993), cited in Bucke et al., (2000), p. 2; 
Grant, (2018); Smith, (2013), p. 2). They argue that silence frustrates the investigation 
process, necessitating adverse inference provisions that coerce the guilty to confess to police 
(Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), (1993), cited in Bucke et al., (2000), p. 2; 
Grant, (2018); Smith, (2013), p. 2). Following the implementation of adverse inference 
provisions in Britain and Ireland by the Thatcher and Major governments, academics such as 
Bucke et al., (2000) pointed predominantly to official statistics to suggest that the overall rate 
of convictions did not increase in the years following the introduction of adverse inference 
laws (pp. 65-72; see also, Jackson et al., (2000)). Evidence specialist, John Jackson, made 
                                                 
10 A Victorian Parliamentary Committee reached a similar conclusion in 1999 (s. 2.3.4).  
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similar findings in Northern Ireland in the early 1990s, concluding that ‘the right of silence 
has been regarded as a sacred cow, but the lesson for those who view abolition or curtailment 
of the right as a panacea for the conviction of offenders is that they may be just as guilty of 
putting their faith in a sacred cow’ (Jackson et al., (1991), p. 416). For these commentators, 
adverse inference provisions have simply translated to ‘more cock and bull stories’, rather 
than more confessions (Bucke et al., (2000), p. 35; Jackson et al., (2000)). Nevertheless, 
Bucke et al. (2000) have suggested that more work is needed to clarify precisely how silence 
works throughout the criminal process and which groups may be disadvantaged by 
restrictions upon it (pp. 67, 76) – disadvantages which may not necessarily appear in large 
aggregated national data sets.  
 
Indeed, more recent academic commentary has pointed to problems with the use of these 
official data sets. The late evidence scholar, Mike Redmayne (2008), for instance, observed 
that the studies in England and Ireland were conducted too soon after the introduction of the 
adverse inference laws to properly quantify their effect and that these studies overlooked the 
impact of recently introduced plea discount legislation (pp. 1081-1083). Redmayne (2008) 
also cited English conviction rates from years other than those cited by the major English 
study to show a substantial increase and variance in convictions following the 
implementation of adverse inference provisions (pp. 1081-1083). A similar increase in the 
conviction rate was observed in Singapore following the introduction of adverse inference 
provisions in that jurisdiction (Meng Heong Yeo, (1983)). Another nuanced view of the 
official statistics, expressed by evidence scholar, Owusu-Bempah (2017), cited the combined 
findings of two English studies conducted both before and after the introduction of adverse 
inference laws (pp. 133-134). Owusu-Bempah (2018) concludes that interference with silence 
laws disproportionately impact black suspects who rely on silence rights more frequently than 
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other suspects (pp. 133-134).11 Indeed, despite the apparent null hypothesis shown by the 
official English and Northern Irish statistics, a large cohort of scholars (some of whom 
themselves helped collate the statistics), has continued to oppose the ‘watering-down’ of 
silence rights, for instance, by the introduction of adverse inference provisions or other forms 
of compulsion. Most such researchers explicitly support stronger use of silence rights in the 
interests of ensuring that criminal procedure operates in accordance with democratic 
principles (see, for instance, Jackson, (2001); Birch, (1999); Dennis (1995); Redmayne, 
(2008); Hocking and Manville, (2001)). They have done so, however, largely in the absence 
of solid evidence. The results of investigation reported in this paper make a fresh and 
significant contribution to the evidence required to support the evidence required to support 
the claim that the use of silence is a critical requirement for democratic criminal process. 
Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this article to explain how and why this is the case. 
Such an explanation requires further in-depth qualitative study, not only comparing those 
who exercise or waive their right to silence; but also study of court process and complexities 
in which such rights are exercised or waived. Combined with the results of quantitative 
investigation, as presented and analysed in this paper, such findings form the necessary 
empirical basis for explaining how and why silence rights are foundational to democratic 
criminal process. Accordingly, the present study may be understood as one piece of a 
complex puzzle in determining how the use of silence works and with what effects, not only 
for individuals but for the democratic integrity of the criminal process.  
 
This study examines the operation of silence rights in the summary criminal jurisdiction of 
New South Wales (NSW) – Australia’s most populous State and a jurisdiction in which 93% 
                                                 
11 Owusu-Bempah cites the combined findings of Phillips and Brown (1998) and Bucke et al. (2000) to show 
that black suspects asserted their right to silence in 21% of cases before the introduction of adverse inference 
laws (compared to 13 and 8 per cent respectively of Asian and white suspects). After the introduction of the 
laws, the figure was 12 per cent (compared with 8 and 9 per cent of Asian and white suspects)).  
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of the State’s criminal matters are heard (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2019)).12 
The aims here are twofold: first, to demonstrate the frequency with which silence rights are 
used by marginalised criminal defendants;13 and, second, to identify their effect on criminal 
conviction for those defendants. The findings from this study show that silence rights are 
asserted throughout the criminal process in a significant majority of summary criminal cases. 
These results further indicate that silence rights play a significant role in mitigating the 
effects of the criminal law, in particular, the impact of convictions upon this marginalised 
group of defendants.  
 
While adverse inference provisions have been introduced relatively recently into the 
indictable jurisdiction of NSW, these laws do not operate at the level of summary jurisdiction 
in which this study was conducted.14 Together with the expansive size of the jurisdiction, the 
absence of adverse inference provisions in this jurisdiction was a key reason for its selection 
as a site of study. This situation renders the results of this study useful as a control test for 
future research on the use and effects of silence rights for vulnerable criminal defendants in 
other jurisdictions, as well as the operation of powers of compulsion (for instance, against 
‘white collar’ crime) in various regulatory jurisdictions. Nevertheless, silence rights within 
this jurisdiction are affected to a minor degree by the power of a court to compel a defendant 
to answer questions at trial, provided a defendant agrees to give evidence (Heydon, (2018), 
pp. 25175-25180).15 Yet the data encountered in this study, as well as the opinion of 
                                                 
12 In 2018, the population of New South Wales was around 8 million: NSW Government, 2019: 
https://www.nsw.gov.au/about-new-south-wales/population/. 
13 The concept of ‘marginalisation’ together with the identity of the particular social group that is the subject of 
this research are discussed on pp. 9-10. 
14 Evidence Act, s. 89A. Similar laws affecting silence in the NSW indictable jurisdiction include the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), ss. 136-143 (amended by the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Pre-Trial Defence 
Disclosure) Bill 2013), together with the Justice Legislation Amendment (Committals and Guilty Pleas) Act 
2017 (NSW), which are designed to encourage early ‘guilty’ pleas through mandatory case conferencing. The 
former requires the defence to disclose its case (facts and argument on which it intends to rely at trial) to the 
prosecution before trial (see Criminal Procedure Act, s. 143). 
15 Evidence Act, ss. 128(4) and (10); Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd (2013) 49 VR 202. 
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Australian evidence scholars, suggest that it is seldom used (Heydon, (2018), p. 25180).16 In 
this respect, summary NSW courts appear to defer to common law protections of silence 
rights (Heydon, (2018), p. 25180)17 that are largely consistent with those contained within the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (UN) (Article 14).18 
 
Method, Samples and Data 
There are a variety of ways to measure silence rights. Past studies have either quantified the 
practices of defendants within a sample group (see, for instance, the approaches of Leng, 
(1993), Phillips and Brown, (1998), Jackson, (1991)(b)), or relied upon official statistics to 
generalise about a particular outcome (for instance, Bucke et al., (2000) and Jackson et al., 
(2000)). Given the objectives of this study (to assess the use of silence rights by marginalised 
defendants in NSW), together with problems associated with the use of official statistics 
outlined above, this study measured silence by reference to a sample group of defendants 
represented by a publicly funded agency reserved for very low-income clients – Legal Aid 
NSW (Legal Aid). A further advantage of this method is that it allows for measurement of 
silence rights over time, throughout the criminal process, from the investigation stage to pre-
trial stage to trial stage. By contrast, most other studies have only examined the investigation 
stage while relying on official statistics to document general rates of conviction and guilty 
pleas. In this respect the method used here is similar to one of the earliest studies by Jackson 
et al. ((1991)(b), Appendix C) which traced the use of silence rights in respect to 121 specific 
matters. The present study is larger, closely examining 350 different matters.  
 
                                                 
16 No use of this power was encountered during this study. 
17 See also, X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92, [124] per Hayne and Bell JJ, Kiefel J 
agreeing; Petty and Maiden v R (1991) 173 CLR 95, per Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey, and McHugh JJ, at [2] the 
High Court said that the right to silence was ‘a fundamental rule of the common law’. 
18 In particular, ICCPR, Art. 14(2) (the presumption of innocence); and Art. 14(3)(g) (the burden of proof, right 
to silence and privilege against self-incrimination).  
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The study presented here used both quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative 
component of the study sought to measure the use and effect of silence rights as recorded in 
summary jurisdiction Legal Aid files. With the assistance of Legal Aid,19 the author gained 
access to a large repository of recently closed Legal Aid files from between January 2016 to 
July 2018.20 Well in excess of 1000 files were examined. This selection was eventually 
narrowed to the final 350 files or 1008 criminal charges from the Haymarket, Parramatta and 
Liverpool offices of Legal Aid. Subject to certain exceptions – discussed below – files were 
selected from the Legal Aid archive at random (using ‘random probability sampling’ 
(Bryman, (2016), pp. 171-195)) and the results quantified.  
 
Qualitative ‘content analysis’ (Bryman, (2016), pp. 285-307) was used to extract primary 
data on the use and effects of silence rights over time from each legal aid file. Documents 
subjected to content analysis within each file included the file cover (indicating the outcome 
of the matter, number of mentions and type of court appearance), police facts and charges, 
client instructions to legal representatives and solicitor notes on court practice, including 
notes on plea bargains or ‘representations’, court submissions and hearing proceedings. These 
documents are usually included within each file as a matter of professional practice and 
internal Legal Aid protocol. In some cases, missing results were obtained from the NSW 
Attorney-General’s Department Local Court hotline.21 The content analysis applied key 
                                                 
19 The author thanks Legal Aid NSW, the Practice Managers of the Summary Criminal Teams at the Haymarket, 
Parramatta and Liverpool offices, as well as the NSW Law Society and the NSW Attorney-General’s 
Department.  
20 Data obtained during this study is protected by legal professional privilege (Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss. 
117-129). Ethics approval to peruse this information for research purposes was pre-provided by Legal Aid 
clients through the standard Legal Aid retainer agreement, as well as a confidentiality agreement executed 
between the author and Legal Aid NSW. Further ethics approval was sought and obtained by the author after 
approaching the NSW Law Society, NSW Attorney-General’s Department, the UTS Ethics Committee and the 
Dean of Research at UTS Law School.  All data has been deidentified prior to publication and is now stored 
securely and privately.  
21 As a matter of NSW Local Court Registry policy, outcomes were only disclosed in respect to matters that 
were determined within a fortnight of the date of inquiry and heard in open court.   
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indicators or criteria for identifying the use and effects of the right to silence throughout three 
key stages of the criminal process: the investigation stage; pre-trial or mention stage; and the 
final determination, ‘trial’ or ‘courtroom’ stage. Indicators used for identifying use of the 
right to silence included waivers and assertions of the right to silence during each of the three 
stages (although partial assertions and denials, discussed in more detail below, were also 
counted). The results of each matter - conviction or dismissal of charges – were applied to 
identify the effects of using or not using the right to silence. 
 
Where the source of this data was a means-tested public defenders’ office, the findings of this 
study reflect the use of the right to silence by a specific social group of marginalised criminal 
defendants. Social exclusion or marginalisation in this context refers to a process by which 
certain people are prevented from accessing similar social and economic opportunities and 
resources available to members of other social groups, due to unequal social relationships 
such as class, race and/or disability (Silver, (1994); Honneth, (1996)). All defendants within 
the sample population for this study were subject to a means test, restricting legal assistance 
to people who earn less than $400 per week and have minimal assets (Legal Aid NSW, 
(2018a)). A significant social outcome of the Legal Aid means test is that Legal Aid clients 
are typically working-poor and unemployed people. Around one-in-six Legal Aid clients self-
identify as Aboriginal (Legal Aid NSW, (2018b), p. 10). Although not quantified in this 
study, nor by Legal Aid, a further striking indicator of marginalisation that emerged during 
the content analysis phase of this study was the number of Legal Aid defendants suffering 
disability, most commonly mental illness. This observation accords with a finding by the 
NSW Judicial Commission that 80% of NSW prisoners suffer mental illness (Gotsis and 
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Donnelly, (2008), pp. 2-3).22 Added to the overall social significance of the results from this 
study is the fact that Legal Aid represents around 57% of criminal defendants that pass 
through the NSW Local Court system.23 Put differently, a majority of criminal defendants in 
this jurisdiction are, at the very least, significantly economically marginalised. 
 
Largely excluded from analysis were matters such as strict liability offences (predominantly 
traffic offences), as well as those that involved diversion to the NSW Drug Court or a mental 
health outcome. Traffic matters were mostly excluded for two reasons: first, they rarely 
appear in the sample due to frequent (but not complete) exclusion by a Legal Aid means test 
(2018a);24 and second, they rarely involve issues of silence rights due to their status as strict 
liability or ‘regulatory’ offences. Strict liability offences do not require proof of a mental 
element of an offence and hence, are rarely challenged by defendants, for example by 
reliance on silence rights. In this respect, the sample in this study was guided by the 
contention raised by Bucke et al. (2000) that silence rights matter more in trials which 
involve issues of fault.25 As the analysis section explains in more detail below, where traffic 
offences account for around 40 per cent of matters in this jurisdiction annually,26 their 
exclusion from analysis accounted for a significant difference in the use and effects of silence 
compared with previous studies and official statistics that counted such offences. 
Diversionary and mental health matters were also excluded from analysis where they depart 
                                                 
22 Levels of mental illness occur at a rate of 31% in the general Australian population (Gotsis and Donnelly, 
(2008), pp. 2-3).  
23 There are two statistics used to obtain this figure. The Legal Aid NSW Annual Report, shows that substantive 
Legal Aid grants and duty lawyer services within the criminal jurisdiction numbered 190,124 in the year 2016-
2017 ((2018b), pp. 164-165). Meanwhile, the Local Court of New South Wales Annual Review 2017, shows that 
the number of matters finalised by the Local Court in that year was 333,564 ((2018), p. 12). The figure of 
190,124 is 57% of 333,564. 
24 The specific wording of the policy excludes legal assitance for matters other than those requiring ‘minor 
assistance’. Traffic offences are mostly punishable by ‘fine only’ and therefore legal representation is excluded 
where these matters require only ‘minor (legal) assistance’ (Legal Aid NSW, (2018a)). 
25 Bucke et al., p. 67. 
26 ABS, Criminal Courts, Australia 2017-2018 dataset for NSW (2019), 4513.0. 
11 
 
from the conventions of criminal procedure.27 As a result, the array of offences surveyed here 
mostly contained fault elements and were punishable by imprisonment, e.g. drug, property 
and assault matters. Unlike strict liability offences, these offences typically provided a 
defendant with a choice as to whether to confess, or plead ‘guilty’ immediately, or to assert 
the right to silence throughout the criminal process.  
 
It must be acknowledged that this study and its methods suffer certain limitations. The study 
does not investigate, for instance, why individual defendants exercise silence rights (for 
example, due to a sense of shame or guilt, or the strength of the prosecution or defence case). 
In this sense, the results are limited to explaining how silence operates as a factor within the 
criminal process in respect to a particular sample group. In this respect, silence rights might 
also be said to constitute a mere vehicle, within the criminal process, by which a range of 
further processes occurs. Socio-legal scholars such as Duff (2007, pp. 191-3) and Lacey 
(2012, 33), for instance, have insisted that law and process only ever exist as a vehicle to 
administer particular social outcomes and is always contingent upon social processes 
extrinsic to the law that endow legal process with meaning. In this respect, the results 
outlined here are indicative only. They do not claim to show a causative relationship between 
silence and conviction. Given the multiplicity of human interactions, chance occurrences and 
unpredictable emotions involved with the criminal law, it is doubtful as to whether any study 
could ever quantify abstract legal process with complete accuracy. Rather, the findings 
presented here represent strong patterns, associations and trends that establish a significant 
correlation between silence and conviction mostly using standard quantitative methods within 
the social sciences.  
                                                 
27 Drug diversion in NSW requires a routine plea of guilty in return for rehabilitative drug treatment (Drug 
Court Act 1988 (NSW), s. 5(1)(c)), while mental health orders follow an alternative path to a finding of guilt 




A further limitation arising from the use of criminal legal files is that charges have been laid 
in every matter. In this sense, the sample excludes from consideration how silence operates at 
the stage of arrest and investigation for prospective Legal Aid clients who have been arrested 
and released from police custody without charge. Insight into the relatively low numbers of 
suspects arrested and released without charge nevertheless exists in the English studies of 
Phillips and Brown (1998) and Bucke et al. (2000). In this respect, however, these studies do 
not clearly distinguish between matters in which an interview was refused outright by a 
suspect and those in which an interview was undertaken to which the suspect responded 
without comment (a ‘no comment interview’) to every answer. Indeed, such a distinction 
could alter the outcome of the results. This study, by comparison, does incorporate 
consideration of such a distinction.  
 
Understanding the Right to Silence 
In attempting to justify the right to silence, commentators have sometimes disagreed about 
the definitional breadth of silence rights. Such disagreement complicates empirical 
measurement of silence rights. Redmayne (2007), for example, has argued that the related 
privilege against self-incrimination (exercised in court) was technically distinct from the right 
to silence (exercised during the investigation stage), as well as the presumption of innocence 
and burden of proof (requiring the prosecution to prove its charge); that it existed chiefly to 
allow citizens to dissociate themselves from a prosecution; that its use contains too many 
variables to accurately assess via empirical analysis; and that it should therefore be defined 
narrowly. Redmayne’s ‘narrow’ definition has since been challenged by evidence law 
commentator, Hamish Stewart (2016), who suggests that there is in fact, ‘an underlying 
normative connection between the presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-
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incrimination, and the requirement that the state make its case without the active testimonial 
participation of the accused’ and that ‘the privilege against self-incrimination carries on 
through the entire criminal process as a concomitant of the presumption of innocence’ (p. 98). 
This broad view appears to be supported by a range of commentators as well as the reading 
given to ICCPR, Art. 14 by the European Court of Justice.28 Indeed, the narrow view that 
silence rights are simply ‘too complex’ to be analysed empirically has little validity in the 
face of numerous international scholars’ (discussed above) empirical research on the right to 
silence and related ‘silence rights’.  
 
In the measurement of silence, some studies have relied on simply a police interview or 
‘narrow view’, while others have used the entire case, taking a ‘broad view’ (Phillips and 
Brown (1998), p. 74; Jackson et al. (1991)). On this point, Bucke et al. (2000) acknowledge 
that measurement of ‘the right to silence’ throughout the case implicates other related rights 
such as the presumption of innocence and burden of proof (pp. 57-59). In addition to 
supporting the broad view, Stewart also indicates his support for its empirical measurement, 
contending that ‘empirical generalisations about the value of interrogations or about how 
people behave when under investigation’ have much to offer, precisely because ‘underlying’ 
silence rights is ‘an empirical conception of the typical level of human fortitude, that is a set 
of assumptions about the ways in which detainees are or are not vulnerable to the pressure of 
interrogation and about what can be done to ensure their choice to speak is a free one,’ as 
well as ‘a belief that detainees are in general a useful source of reliable information about the 
crime’ (p. 100).  
 
                                                 
28 See Duff (2007); and Hocking and Manville (2001). The decisions of the ECJ as well as the European Charter 
position were discussed by the Privy Council in Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681. 
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It is on this basis that this study takes a broad view of ‘silence rights’, mapping their use and 
effects throughout three key phases of the criminal process – the investigation, pre-trial and 
determination stages. In doing so, this project analyses the use of the ‘right to silence’ by 
suspects during the investigation stage of proceedings when police are required to caution a 
suspect and offer the suspect a police interview. Next, it assesses the use of the presumption 
of innocence, burden of proof, together with the privilege against self-incrimination at the 
pre-trial or ‘mention stage’ when defendants first attend court. It is at this point that 
defendants may elect to confess to a charge by waiving their silence rights and pleading 
‘guilty’.  
 
Alternatively, defendants at this point may contest a charge by pleading ‘not guilty’, invoking 
their silence rights in the form of the presumption of innocence, burden of proof and privilege 
against self-incrimination. In practical terms, this usually means that a defendant simply 
remains silent in the weeks and months leading up to a summary trial or ‘hearing date’, in 
turn requiring the prosecution to prove its case against them at the hearing. Finally, the study 
assesses the use of the privilege against self-incrimination by defendants in a small number of 
cases that ran to summary trial. The frequency of use of silence rights throughout these three 
stages is then compared with outcomes to ascertain the ‘effects’ of silence. Outcomes are 
measured by assessing any resulting convictions, non-convictions or plea bargains.  
 
Complicating the broad view of silence rights, however, is the fact that assertions of silence 
rights are sometimes merely partial or used in combination with their waiver. For example, a 
suspect may make admissions to only one or two police questions. Alternatively, after 
refusing a police interview a defendant may nevertheless plead guilty or give evidence in 
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court.29 For practical purposes, the defendant waives the privilege, but nevertheless asserts 
the burden and standard of proof by pleading ‘not guilty’, requiring the prosecution to prove 
its case at hearing beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that any mapping process involving 
silence rights must account for their assertion both over time or, throughout the process, as 
well as, in combination with their waiver – hence the classification of the criminal process 
into three stages in this study. A further design feature of this study that accounts for the 
nebulous nature of the silence rights is the separate measurement of ‘denials’ in police 
interviews as distinct from confessions and declined interviews during the investigation 
stage.30 By making a denial, a defendant technically waives the right to silence. However, the 
logical implication of a denial is actually to assert other freedoms that flow from the right to 
silence, such as the presumption of innocence and burden of proof. By extension, these 
silence rights require the prosecution to prove its case to the requisite standard of proof. It is 
for this reason that waivers are measured in this study as a logical separate category of silence 
rights. In this way, they can easily be added to or subtracted from more conventional 
measures of silence rights, depending on whether the reader adopts a narrow or broad view of 
silence rights. As indicated above, the broad view is preferred in this study.    
 
Frequency of Use  
Eight key measures were used to assess the frequency of silence rights. The first involved 
comparing the number of admissions and non-admissions during the investigation stage. This 
measure provides for the frequency of assertions and waivers of the right to silence during the 
                                                 
29 Evidence Act, s. 128(10) abolishes the privilege for defendants who give evidence at trial: see, Cornwell v R 
(2007) 231 CLR 260, provided that a defendant chooses to enter the witness box: Chong v CC Containers Pty 
Ltd (2013) 49 VR 202. 
30 Denials made during the investigation stage are commonly classified by the law of evidence as, ‘admissible 
hearsay’ evidence or, ‘previous representations that are not adverse to a person’s interest’ (Odgers, (2018), p. 
598, p. 611); see also, Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96. In this case, ‘denials’ were classified as, ‘a 
previous representation that is not adverse to a person’s interest’. 
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investigation stage. Admissions here included legally admissible post-arrest confessions, 
either upon arrest or during police interviews.31 Non-admissions, on the other hand, included 
‘no comment’ police interviews and declined interviews. As discussed, investigation stage 
‘denials’ were counted separately. Suspects who made partial admissions were counted as 
either making admissions or denials (depending on whether they denied the charge) but were 
wholly excluded from the category of assertions of the right to silence. 
 
The second measure counted ‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’ pleas throughout the initial courtroom 
or ‘mention’ stage of proceedings to assess the frequency of assertions and waivers of both 
the privilege against self-incrimination and burden of proof during the mention stage. 
Similarly, the third measure counted final and changed pleas (from ‘not guilty’ to ‘guilty’) at 
the sentencing or hearing stages of proceedings. The fourth measure involved a simple count 
of the number of charges in which defendants gave evidence at hearing (measure 4), 
assessing the frequency of assertions and waivers of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Measure 5 counted charges in which evidence given during an interview was repeated at 
hearing, assessing the frequency of ‘denials’ or charges in which waivers of the right to 
silence and privilege against self-incrimination were combined with assertions of the burden 
of proof.   
 
The sixth measure (‘total assertions’ and ‘total waivers’) involved adding up the number of 
charges in which any assertion or waiver of either the right to silence, burden or standard of 
proof, or privilege against self-incrimination was made at any stage throughout the criminal 
process, including combined assertions and wavers. The category of ‘total assertions’ 
                                                 
31 See, Evidence Act, ss. 81-90 (admissions are defined by s. 3 of the Act as a ‘previous representation’, made by 
a criminal defendant that is ‘adverse to the person’s interest in the outcome of the proceeding’).  
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included: silence upon arrest, declining or refusing to answer questions during a police 
interview, as well as pleading ‘not guilty’, or refraining from giving evidence at hearing. 
‘Total waivers’ included confessions and admissions (either at the scene, upon arrest or 
during a police interview), pleas of ‘guilty’, and giving evidence at hearing.32 Denials were 
tallied separately.33  
 
The seventh measure of frequency involved the number of ‘consistent assertions’ and 
‘consistent waivers’ of silence rights. Consistent waivers included matters in which 
defendants completely or consistently waived the right silence by confessing during the 
investigation stage and pleaded ‘guilty’ during the pre-trial stage, thereby dispensing with 
burden of proof. Consistent assertions were those matters in which defendants completely 
asserted the privilege against self-incrimination, together with the burden and standard of 
proof, at all stages of the criminal process - declining an interview, pleading ‘not guilty’ and 
proceeding to hearing without giving evidence.  
 
Measure eight involved tallying charges and matters resolved by representations. 
Representations are a form of charge bargaining, usually requiring the negotiation of multiple 
charges between defence and prosecution, i.e. the withdrawal of some charges in exchange 
for a ‘guilty’ plea to others. The related nature of silence rights across multiple charges within 
a given matter in which representations are made means that, in this study, representations 
were counted by ‘matters’, rather than charges. A range of sub-measures was used to count 
the frequency of the use of silence rights among these matters. 
 
                                                 
32 As units of analysis, ‘total assertions’ and ‘total waivers’ contain overlapping variables and are only 
comparable by univariate analysis. 
33 Although given the small number of denials, their addition to either category of analysis would not make a 
significant difference.  
18 
 
Measure 1: Silence during the investigation stage 
During the investigation stage, 364 charges (36%) were the subject of admissions or waivers. 
A further 89 charges (8.8%) saw defendants give an interview in order to deny the charges - 
waiving the privilege while asserting the burden and standard of proof. In a majority of 555 
charges (55%), however, defendants made no admissions, asserting the privilege instead. 
These figures are illustrated in the first frequency plot in Figure A,34 below.  
 
If denials are added to assertions, we can see that silence rights were invoked across an 
overwhelming majority of 644 charges (64%) during the investigation stage. In this respect, 
assertions of silence rights during the investigation stage occurred ten per more frequently 




   
                                                 













Measure 2: Silence during the mention stage 
 
During the initial courtroom or mention stage, 604 charges (60%) proceeded by way of 
‘guilty’ plea, while 404 charges (40%) remained either undecided or were subject to pleas of 
‘not guilty’. Undecided pleas, usually due to pending ‘representations’ or charge negotiation 
between defence and prosecution, were counted here as pleas of ‘not guilty’. The shrinking 
number of assertions of silence rights at this stage of the criminal process is depicted in the 
second frequency plot in Figure A, above. The fact that a majority of charges involved a 
waiver of the privilege by way of ‘guilty’ pleas reflects and confirms official data in respect 
to the ‘method of finalisation’ (numbers of ‘plea’ and ‘hearing’ matters) in the NSW 
summary jurisdiction (ABS, (2019)).35 As the hackneyed adage goes, ‘without guilty pleas, 
the wheels of justice would grind to a halt’. Confirmation of this finding also shows that the 
data collected here are readily generalisable and not anomalous.  
 
Measure 3: Silence during the final courtroom stage 
The number of ‘guilty’ pleas at the final courtroom stage of the criminal process reflects, 
once again, existing data on ‘pleas’ and ‘hearings’ in the NSW Summary Jurisdiction (NSW 
Bureau of Crime Statistics And Research (BOCSAR), (2018a)). During this stage, there was 
a significant change in the number of ‘not guilty’ pleas, with 138 (14%) of these pleas (to 
individual charges) switched to pleas of ‘guilty’. As discussed further below, this change is 
mostly attributable to the plea-bargaining process.  
 
In total, 743 charges (74%) at this stage involved ‘guilty’ pleas while 265 (26%) proceeded 
by way of ‘not guilty’ pleas. This growth from a significant majority of assertions of silence 
rights at the outset of the criminal process, to an overwhelming majority of waivers of silence 
                                                 
35 ‘NSW – Method of Finalisation’.  
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rights by the end of the criminal process, is a new and significant finding. It is represented 
within the third frequency plot in Figure A above.  
 
Measure 4: Evidence during hearing 
Defendants gave evidence during the hearing of 35 charges (3.4%). From a total of 145 
charges (14.4%) that ran to hearing, around one quarter (24.3%) involved defendants giving 
evidence (see the third frequency plot in Figure A).  
 
Measure 5: Evidence during hearing given in interview 
Of the charges in which defendants gave evidence at hearing, 14 defendants (1.3% of all 
charges or 40% of charges in which defendants gave evidence at hearing) repeated the same 
evidence (denials) given during a police interview. This practice had a significant impact on 
the result of the charge, as the next section on the ‘effects of the right to silence’ shows. The 
frequency of evidence given during the hearing, also given during the interview, is plotted in 
the larger graph at the bottom of Figure A.  
 
Measure 6: Total assertions and waivers 
Total assertions of silence rights across all stages of the criminal process (all charges in 
which defendants either declined an interview or pleaded ‘not guilty’ or did both), numbered 
627 charges (62%). Note that this figure excludes denials. Total waivers (all charges in which 
defendants either made full admissions during the investigation stage, pleaded ‘guilty’ or 
gave evidence at hearing), numbered 737 charges (73%). Note that these are overlapping 
variables and must be compared to each other through univariate analysis. The exclusion of 
denials from this analysis yields a marginally different result to that deployed during the 
investigation stage (by 2%). Overall, this measure reflects existing understandings of the 
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basic procedural patterns within the criminal process in which most defendants elect to plead 
‘guilty’. What is surprising, however, is that silence rights were asserted so frequently, in 
62% of charges, at some stage throughout the criminal process.   
 
These results are plotted on the larger graph at the bottom of Figure A. In this way, this graph 
provides a visual representation of the use of silence rights by defendants, over time, from the 
beginning of the criminal process until its conclusion. It represents the general tendency for 
assertions of silence rights during the investigation stage to become waivers resulting in 
guilty pleas.  
 
Measure 7: Consistent assertions and waivers 
In only a minority of charges did defendants both completely and consistently assert or waive 
their silence rights throughout the criminal process. The right to silence, burden of proof and 
privilege against self-incrimination were consistently and completely asserted, through a 
combination of no admissions, ‘not guilty’ pleas and silence at hearing (where matters ran to 
hearing) across 195 charges (19.5%). Meanwhile, silence rights were consistently and 
completely waived, through a combination of full admissions and ‘guilty’ pleas, in 320 
charges (31.5%).  
 
Measure 8: Representations 
Nearly one third of charges (290 charges (28.9%)) was the subject of representations or plea 
bargaining – 75 matters in total. In this respect, another significant finding of the study was 
that in order to facilitate plea or charge bargaining, defendants were required to maintain the 
privilege against self-incrimination until the bargain was negotiated. In only 14 out of 75 
matters (18.6% of matters) did defendants make admissions prior to the bargaining process. 
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The remaining matters involved either denials (11 matters or 14.6%) or no admissions (50 
matters (66.6%). In this sense, it appears that the right to silence and the privilege against 
self-incrimination, in particular, are crucial to the plea-bargaining process.  
 
Effects of the Right to Silence 
The effects of silence rights were measured here by assessing their impact on conviction. 
Convictions involve a finding or acceptance of a plea of guilty by a magistrate, followed by 
the imposition of a conviction. They are distinguished here from ‘non-convictions’. In this 
study, non-convictions included instances when charges were laid, filed and later withdrawn 
by police (withdrawn charges) as well as charges resulting in a non-conviction disposition 
under s. 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing and Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). Non-convictions 
were also recorded in this study when charges were dismissed after a finding of ‘not guilty’ at 
summary hearing. The overwhelming majority of non-conviction matters recorded here were 
charges that were withdrawn by police in response to a plea of ‘not guilty’. The statistics 
evaluated in this second part of the survey show correlations between silence and conviction. 
 
Measure 1: Silence during the investigation stage resulting in conviction 
Of 453 charges in which defendants participated in a police interview or made admissions 
during the investigation stage (including denials), 362 (37% of all charges or 80% of matters 
in which police interviews were given) resulted in conviction. Of 555 charges associated with 
non-interviews, by comparison, 333 of these (33% of all charges or 60% of all non-interview 
matters) resulted in conviction. Accordingly, there is a statistical difference of 20% between 
interview and non-interview matters resulting in conviction. This correlative relationship is 
strengthened by the fact that between the investigation stage and the final courtroom stage, 
confessions or pleas of ‘guilty’ increased (from 453, during the investigation stage, to 743 at 
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the final stage) by nearly one third (29%). Of 110 charges in which denials were made during 
the investigation stage (exclusive of waivers of the right to silence by admissions), 57 (51.8% 
or 5.65% of all charges) resulted in conviction, mostly through guilty pleas.  
 
Measure 436: Evidence given at hearing resulting in conviction  
A total of 144 charges ran to hearing. Among the 35 charges in which defendants gave 
evidence at hearing, 13 charges (37.14% or 1.28% of all charges) resulted in conviction. 
These high rates of non-conviction associated with giving evidence at hearing appear to be 
associated with the repetition of a denial made during a police interview at hearing. This is 
explained by the following statistic discussed in Measure 5. As discussed further in the 
‘analysis’ section below, such an association is not, on its own, determinative of conviction. 
As previously discussed (p. 11), such an association shows that silence rights do impact upon 
conviction but are also a constitutive vehicle for other trial processes or variables such as the 
strength of the prosecution case or the defendant’s past experience of the legal system. 
 
Measure 5: Evidence given at hearing, also given in interview, resulting in conviction 
Of the 35 charges in which defendants gave evidence at hearing, 14 of these (40% or 1.38% 
of all charges) involved defendants repeating denials made during a police interview. All but 
one of these charges (93%) resulted in an acquittal or dismissal of charges. Despite the 
numbers being small, these statistics indicate that a consistent and adamant denial of charges 
is the most powerful defence against any criminal accusation. In terms of silence rights this 
shows that in a small minority of matters, consistently waiving the right to silence from the 
interview stage by making a denial and maintaining this denial  until the final stage of the 
                                                 
36 Note that ‘Measure 2: Silence during the mention stage’ and ‘Measure 3: Silence during the final courtroom 
stage’ have been excised from comparison with effects here where the results of waiver in Measure 2 obviously 
result in conviction, while the results from both measures overlap with and are counted in Measures 4, 7 and 8 
in the ‘effects on conviction’ section.  
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criminal process (hearing), shares a compelling correlation with acquittal or dismissal of 
charges following the hearing. This claim must be treated with some caution, however, as it is 
based on a small sample of data from within the larger study and is affected by the presence 
of untested variables. 
 
Measure 6: Total assertions and waivers resulting in conviction  
From a total of 627 charges in which defendants asserted the right to silence at some point 
during the criminal process, 367 such charges resulted in conviction (36% of all charges, or a 
rate of 58% of all charges in which the right to silence was asserted). Meanwhile, from a total 
of 737 charges in which defendants waived the right to silence at some point throughout the 
process, 697 resulted in conviction (69% of all charges, or a rate of 95% of all charges in 
which the right to silence was waived). This marked variation in outcomes – a difference of 
37% across such a large part of the sample group within this study - indicates that for the 
largest cohort of criminal defendants, even sporadic assertions of the right to silence were 
associated with significantly fewer convictions than its sporadic waiver. Sporadic waiver, by 
contrast, almost always correlated with conviction. These results are depicted on the graph in 
Figure B, below (it must be remembered that the category of ‘total assertions and total 















Measure 7: Consistent assertions and waivers resulting in conviction 
 
This measure led to the most significant finding from this study. It showed that of the 195 
charges where defendants consistently and completely maintained or asserted silence rights 
throughout the criminal process, only 27 charges correlated with conviction (2.7% of all 
charges or 13.8% of all complete assertions of the privilege). Another way of putting this is 
that there was no conviction in 86.2% of cases in which silence was consistently asserted. 
Consistent waivers of the privilege, on the other hand, which occurred in 320 charges, were 
associated with a conviction rate of 96.3% (308 charges or 30.5% of all charges).37 This 
comparison is presented in the graph at Figure C, pictured below. The substantial difference 
between complete waivers and assertions of the right to silence across charges is partly 
                                                 
37 An acquittal rate of 3.3%. 
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explained by the process of charge-bargaining, (discussed below). This measure involved 








Measure 8: Representations resulting in conviction / reps resulting in amended facts / reps 
resulting in serious charges being withdrawn  
 
Of the 75 matters involved in the charge bargaining process, 57 (76%) resulted in charges 
being withdrawn by the prosecution before the final stage of proceedings. Of these matters, 
46 (61%) involved the withdrawal of serious charges (charges containing offences punishable 
by two years or more imprisonment), while 20 involved a significantly mitigating amendment 
of facts. In only two matters (2.6%) in which representations were made, did the prosecution 
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refuse to either withdraw charges and/or amend the facts towards a mitigated outcome for the 
defendant.  
 
All matters containing representations resulted in at least one conviction. Indeed, a plea to at 
least one charge is usually a requirement of the plea or charge bargaining process. But just as 
the charge bargaining process requires the defendant to waive the burden of proof and 
privilege against self-incrimination in this way, the entire process of charge-bargaining 
appears to hinge on silence rights. Logically speaking, a bargain is rarely possible if one side 
capitulates from the outset. This logic is borne out by the statistics presented here and above, 
demonstrating that in only 18.6% of plea bargain matters did defendants waive their right to 




Comparison with official statistics and findings from previous studies mostly shows that the 
data collected here was not anomalous and within the range found in previous studies, when 
variables in this study are accounted for. Guilty pleas in this study at the final determination 
stage reached 74%. This is similar to the rate of guilty pleas tabled by the official statistics in 
this jurisdiction both in NSW and the UK (77%) (BOCSAR, (2018b), Table 3; Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS), (2019), Q1).38 The use of silence during the investigation stage 
sat at 55%39 in this study, which falls within the range40 found by previous studies and is 
identical to the rate at which the most socially marginalised defendants in the study of 
                                                 
38 Note that the Australian and UK statistics differ slightly by the unit of analysis measured. Australian crime 
statisticians predominantly measure numbers of defendants (see ABS and BOCSAR), while the statisticians in 
the UK (CPS and Office of National Statistics (ONA)) measure charges. Incidentally, charges were the unit of 
analysis used in this study.  
39 The figure is 64% is denials are included. 
40 Among studies of the right to silence, figures measuring its exercise vary between 45-60% (Softley, (1980); 
Sanders, Bridges, Mulvaney, and Crozier, (1989); Moston, Stephenson and Williamson, (1993); Moston and 
Stephenson, (1993); Evans, (1993)). 
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Phillips and Brown (1998) exercised the right to silence (pp. 71-73). Incidentally, this figure 
declined significantly to 39% in the post-adverse inference provision study of Bucke et al. 
(2000) and was cut in half for the most socially marginalised defendants in that study (p. 32; 
Owusu-Bempah (2017), pp. 133-134). 
 
The conviction rate in this study was 70%.41 The official conviction rate in this jurisdiction is 
91% (BOCSAR, (2018b)). Variance between these figures is probably attributable to 
comparatively fewer strict liability traffic matters within the Legal Aid sample. Traffic 
matters account for 40% of matters in this jurisdiction (ABS, 2019). Without traffic matters, 
the conviction rate from this study more closely resembles that found in indictable courts in 
both NSW and the UK (72-85%) - courts which do not regularly hear traffic matters.42 When 
the absence of traffic matters is accounted for, it may be that the minor variance in conviction 
rates between these jurisdictions (between 2-15%) is also related to the absence of adverse 
inference provisions in this jurisdiction. Clearly, these results differ from those of Buck et al. 
(2000) which show that adverse inference provisions have nil effect on conviction rates (p. 
66). Instead, conviction rates in this study might be seen as supporting the view of Redmayne 
(2008): that adverse inference provisions probably have some effect but one that is partly 
indeterminate due to the presence of other variables (pp. 1081-1083). But this study was not 
exclusively focused on the effect of adverse inference provisions and its findings have wider 
implications for understanding the general operation of silence rights.   
 
 
                                                 
41 The fact that the conviction rate is less than the number of guilty pleas is attributable to the high number of 
dismissals of charges in this jurisdiction that occur during 17% of all sentencing hearings (Attorney General and 
Justice NSW, (2011), p. 28).  
42 The conviction rate in these higher courts has, for the last five years fluctuated between around 72-85% (see 
BOCSAR, (2018a) and CPS (2019). 
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The most significant and new findings from this study arose from the measurement of silence 
use and its effects over time in periodic stages throughout the criminal process. Such an 
approach showed that there is a correlation between consistent or complete assertions of the 
right to silence (consistently maintaining silence throughout the criminal process) and lower 
rates of conviction.43 As Figure C shows, 86.2% of consistent assertions of the right to 
silence (168 charges) were associated with acquittals or the equivalent, compared with only 
3.3% of consistent waivers (12 charges). Further, as shown by Figure B, assertions of the 
right to silence generally had more favourable results and were associated with substantially 
fewer convictions than waivers of silence rights. Defendants were: 20% less likely to be 
convicted after exercising silence rights in the investigation stage; 37% less likely to be 
convicted after exercising silence rights sporadically throughout the entire process (compared 
to sporadic waiver); and 82.5% less likely to be convicted as a result of completely or 
consistently asserting silence rights (compared to its consistently waiving them).  
 
Placed in context, these findings mean that for a majority of marginalised defendants, there 
may be a tactical or strategic advantage to the exercise of silence rights in the type of cases 
surveyed here (i.e. non-regulatory summary matters). However, it must be remembered that 
these results are affected by other variables such as the strength of the evidence, experience 
with the criminal justice system and, to a lesser degree, the seriousness of the charge (Phillips 
and Brown, (1998), p. 74). In this way, silence rights might be seen as a processual vehicle 
through which other variables are expressed. But, as explained above by reference to the 
work of Stewart (2016) and Bucke et al. (2000), there is empirical value in measuring and 
                                                 
43 When subjected to a Pearson’s Chi-Squared Test of the null hypothesis that there is no association between 
assertion type and conviction, the results were as follows: χ2 = 358.27, df = 1, p < 0.001. A p-value of less than 
0.001 resulted from a comparison with a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom. Taken at a 
standard or accepted level of error of 0.05, the null hypothesis that there is no association between assertion and 
conviction can be safely rejected. Ipso facto, it can be concluded that there is an association between assertions 
and conviction.  
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understanding how silence is exercised and operates, particularly where understandings of its 
operation are contested and where no published empirical studies have measured its operation 
in this jurisdiction.  
 
It is noted that this study did not measure the use of silence rights by non-marginalised 
defendants. Nevertheless, the larger studies of Phillips and Brown (1998) and Bucke et al 
(2000), do provide some measure of comparison between silence use between various social 
groups, as does a comparison between the statistics produced by this study and the official 
English and NSW statistics, discussed above (pp. 28-29).44 It is on the basis of these 
statistical differences that this study has been reluctant to draw wider generalisations or 
inferences about the use of silence rights by all summary criminal defendants (i.e. non-
marginalised criminal defendants), other than those sampled within the discrete dataset used 
in this study. Accordingly, caution has been exercised in this analysis, restricting 
observations to the experience of the marginalised defendants who were the subjects of this 
study. In this important respect, this study provides the basis for further comparative analysis. 
 
The results from Measure 5B add nuance and further explanation to the above findings. They 
show that when silence is used in a very specific but consistent way – by denying the charge 
at the investigation stage and repeating this denial in evidence at hearing (waiving the right to 
silence and privilege against self-incrimination while asserting the burden of proof) – it is 
associated with even lower rates of conviction than complete assertions of the silence rights 
(in 93% or 13 out of 14 charges of these charges). Nevertheless, the fact that this specific 
combination of practices of consistently denying the charge occurred in so few charges (14 
                                                 
44 It must also be remembered that the marginalised client base represented by Legal Aid NSW account for 
around 57% of the NSW summary court population (see p. 10 and Footnote 23). 
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charges or 1.4% of charges) means that any association between this practice with rates of 
conviction borders on statistical insignificance, requiring a further and much larger study to 
assess its significance.45 One suggested implication of this finding, however, is that waiving 
the right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination or repeating the evidence from the 
interview at hearing, favours defendants who are either emphatically innocent or able to 
maintain a consistent and coherent defence throughout the criminal process. But the minimal 
amount of data collected in support of this contention shows that legally aided criminal 
defendants who possess these characteristics are certainly in the minority. Accordingly, this 
variation in the findings supports the tentative conclusion, drawn above, that the association 
between silence rights and conviction means that silence rights are procedurally important, 
ensuring fairness for marginalised defendants throughout the criminal process. For a majority 
of summary criminal defendants who are perhaps not able to craft and maintain a 
sophisticated ‘denial’ of allegations, silence rights are the only realistic, effective and fair 
option to protect innocence against false accusations of guilt.  
 
This secondary result involving the waiver of silence rights further shows that other factors 
such as the strength of the evidence and experience with the criminal justice system, have a 
role to play in the way that silence rights are exercised. To be clear, while silence rights share 
an association with conviction, they do not, on their own, determine conviction. They are an 
important factor or vehicle by which other factors, such as the strength of the evidence, 
experience within the legal system and so on are played out and expressed. To what extent 
these other factors play a role in the exercise of silence rights remains unclear but the 
                                                 
45 When analysed by way of a chi-squared test (a null hypothesis that there is no association between waivers 
and non-convictions) the p-value (resulting from the number of denials) was slightly below ‘1’. Supposing an 
accepted level of error of 0.05, these results suggest that there is not enough data available to make a definitive 




tangential observations of the sample in this study are illuminating. In previous studies, the 
provision of legal advice played a major part in a defendant’s decision to exercise silence 
rights at the police station (Phillips and Brown, (1998), p. 72; Sanders et al. (1989); Moston, 
Stephenson and Williamson, (1992)), yet none of the defendants surveyed here accessed a 
lawyer during the investigation period and most exercised the right to silence upon arrest. In 
other studies, stronger evidence of an offence corresponded with more frequent admissions 
(Phillips and Brown, (1998), p. 72-76; Sanders et al. (1989); Moston, Stephenson and 
Williamson, (1992)). Those results seem to have been confirmed here with a greater 
likelihood of admissions in cases with CCTV footage and independent eyewitness statements. 
A more detailed appraisal of the role of these other factors in the exercise of silence rights, 
however, is beyond the scope of this study, requiring further research. 
 
These findings on the significance of silence rights also had important ramifications for the 
process of charge-bargaining. This study found that the right to silence was exercised in 
significantly higher proportions during the process of charge-bargaining (across 81.4% of 
charge-bargaining matters – see Measure 8A). As a matter of logic, charge negotiation would 
be substantially impaired if defendants disclosed their case or confessed to all charges in their 
case prior to commencing the negotiation process. That admissions reduce the bargaining 
power of defendants is confirmed by the statistical data presented here showing that strong 
and frequent assertions of silence rights during the investigation and mention stages are 
integral to the process of charge-bargaining. Measure 8B shows that preservation of silence 
rights by defendants during the investigation stage was associated with a negotiated outcome 
of the matter, leading charges to be withdrawn in 76% of charge-bargaining matters. The 
assertion of silence rights during the investigation stage appears to facilitate the charge 
negotiation process. This has crucial relevance to NSW lawmakers, particularly where the 
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NSW Parliament has passed two pieces of legislation within the last five years seeking to 
encourage charge-bargaining.46 What these data and analysis suggest is that in order for 
parties to reach a negotiated outcome, as encouraged by the State, silence rights must be 
protected and strengthened.  
 
The key finding that silence rights are associated with conviction outcomes poses an 
intriguing question for the results of previous studies showing that there is no causal link 
between the watering-down of silence rights (for instance, through adverse inference 
provisions) and the overall conviction rate. As stated at the outset, this study does not seek to 
challenge those findings. Rather, the results from this study have sought to explain data that 
resembles a cross-section of results from larger studies in order to shed light on unresolved 
questions that they pose. In the process, this study revealed new evidence about the workings 
of silence rights in an Australian summary jurisdiction.  
 
Key findings on the use and effects of silence rights by marginalised criminal defendants in 
mostly non-regulatory matters in the summary jurisdiction of NSW may be summarised as 
follows: 
 
 The right to silence is exercised most frequently during the investigation stage of the 
criminal process in 55% of charges (about the same rate as the exercise of those rights 
by comparable defendants in the comparable jurisdiction of the UK, prior to the 
introduction of adverse inference provisions). 
                                                 
46 See the, Criminal Procedure Amendment (Pre-Trial Defence Disclosure) Act 2013 (NSW); and the Justice 
Legislation Amendment (Committals and Guilty Pleas) Act 2017 (NSW). 
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 Silence rights have an association with conviction (obviously, at the mention stage 
when its waiver by guilty plea most commonly results in conviction,47 but also) when 
exercised consistently throughout the criminal process. 
 Consistent exercise of silence rights throughout the criminal process occurred in 17% 
of charges and correlating with more acquittals (86.2%) than their inconsistent 
exercise or waiver.48 
 Consistent denials of the charge (mixing the waiver of the right to silence and 
privilege against self-incrimination with an assertion of the burden of proof) occurred 
in 1.5% of charges, correlating with a high proportion of aquittals (93%). 
 Silence rights are asserted in 81% of charge-bargaining matters, appearing to assist 
negotiated outcomes in which a plea of guilty to at least one charge was exchanged 




In measuring silence rights in this jurisdiction, it is possible to say that silence is associated 
with conviction for marginalised defendants in certain matters. That is, silence matters for the 
most marginalised people in the criminal justice system. Consistent assertions of silence 
rights for this group of defendants share an association with non-conviction. In a few discrete 
cases, it is possible that the consistent and deftly used waiver of the right to silence to deny 
criminal allegations, can result in a more thorough routing of the prosecution case than a 
consistent assertion of silence rights. Nevertheless, the weight of evidence examined here 
suggests that consistent assertions of silence, rather than consistent waiver by denial of 
charges, is more frequently associated with non-conviction for this group of defendants. In 
                                                 
47 Although, the court nevertheless maintains discretion to impose no conviction (under the Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999, s. 10) and in fact, the disparity between the rate of guilty pleas (74%) and convictions 
(70%) illustrates this discretion.  
48 This category excludes denials. 
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addition, silence rights appear to play a role in the smooth and efficient operation of criminal 
process, in particular, the process of plea-bargaining.  
 
These findings have other ramifications requiring further analysis. First, there is some support 
for the claim that adverse inference provisions in the indictable jurisdiction of NSW do have 
some effect – albeit a small one - on increased conviction rates, when compared with the 
results in this jurisdiction. A comparative study in that jurisdiction, reliant on the present 
findings, may provide an answer. Second, it remains to be seen whether alteration of silence 
rights by powers of compulsory interview, such as those possessed by regulatory agencies, 
have any impact on rates of conviction when compared with the results of this study. Again, a 
further comparative study in one or more of these regulatory jurisdictions that relies on the 
present findings, may prove useful here. And third, the findings of this study relating to use 
of silence rights by specifically marginalised defendants would be bolstered by a further and 
similar study on the exercise of silence rights by non-marginalised criminal defendants in the 
summary jurisdiction of NSW. 
 
 
The results of this study, by shining further light on the relationship between use of silence 
rights and their effect on conviction for socially marginalised defendants in non-regulatory 
summary offences, suggest that silence rights are a critical democratic right for this 
constituency. Paradoxically, perhaps, silence rights may be understood as permitting 
marginalised criminal defendants to ‘have a say’ over their destiny. However, this implication 
requires further paths of inquiry for its establishment: i) a qualitative analysis of relevant case 
law; and ii) a theoretically-informed analysis and discussion of the findings from this study. 
At stake here is a concern voiced by Australian ‘critical realist’ criminologist, Robert Hogg 
(1987), who cautioned that ‘there is an enormous potential for’ truthful criminology ‘to be 
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politically harnessed in a conservative direction’ (pp. 136-137), such as by extending adverse 
inference provisions or introducing further measures of compulsion against marginalised 
defendants. Against such reactionary politics, Hogg (1987) encouraged policy makers, 
lawyers and criminologists to continue to reveal data but to confront it by continuing to 
democratise criminal process for those subject to it, advocating ‘coherent (social) programs, 
and strategies’ (pp. 136-137), rather than restrictions on democratic processes. Hence, it is 
imperative to elaborate from these findings further through a more detailed theoretical and 
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